INITED AMARIA DIAMBIAM AAIDM

2	DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
5	Plaintiff,	Criminal No. 04-160 (JAF)
6	V.	
7 8	RENE VAZQUEZ-BOTET, MARCOS MORELL-CORRADA,	
9	Defendants.	

POST-CONVICTION ORDER REGARDING UNOPPOSED TERMS OF RELEASE PENDING SENTENCE

There is no constitutional right to bail once a person has been convicted. <u>United States v. Baca</u>, 444 F.2d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971). The 1984 amendments to the Bail Reform Act changed what had previously been a presumption for post-conviction bail pending sentencing to a presumption against post-conviction release pending sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(2). The statute reads as follows in its pertinent part:

The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense . . . and is awaiting imposition . . . of sentence be detained unless . . . the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released.

In other words, the federal law we applied today clearly presumes that a convicted defendant will be jailed while he awaits his sentencing.

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The Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the 1984 amendments to the Bail Reform Act said that,

[o]nce guilt of a crime has been established in a court of law there is no reason to favor release pending imposition of sentence . . . The conviction, in which the defendants' guilt of a crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, is presumably correct in law.

A second policy behind what is now the presumption in favor of post-conviction detention pending sentencing, according to the Committee Report, is that "release of a criminal defendant into the community after conviction may undermine the deterrent effect of the criminal law." We firmly believe in and endorse this reasoning in this type of corruption case.

The court's view is that denying bail pending sentence in the present case reinforces the deterrent effect of the criminal laws particularly well. The facts of this case are unfortunate. The public and private sectors in Puerto Rico are infected by corruption, to the point that the community wonders whether we have reached the point of no return. Precisely because of that, this case has been subjected to public scrutiny. It appears that the conduct which the jury has found was deliberate and egregious. It included the exploitation of positions of public trust within Puerto Rico's government and political party structures for personal and political gain.

Defendants, with their actions motivated by greed, betrayed not only their families and the community, but also a large constituency of law-abiding persons that belong to the political party the defendants worked for. These actions erode public confidence in the very basic roots of the democratic system of government and betray the democratic ideals of the political party in question.

Defendants conspired to extort, and indeed extorted monies from government contractors, forcing them to pay bribes in order to secure government contracts. Defendants participated in disguising and laundering the extortion monies. They deprived the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of legitimately-due income tax payments. Now that the defendants have been convicted of harming the community with these criminal acts, the public's eye is closely trained on this court to see what are the consequences for this kind of conduct. It is the court's duty to establish that we take these crimes seriously and that the consequences for this conduct bring about incarceration as a powerful and needed deterrent in this community.

Although we would have normally ordered bail revoked in this type of case, the government expressed no objection and consented to the consideration of bail pending sentence. The government appears to believe that the defendants do not pose a flight risk if the bail is adjusted to account for the conviction.

In view of these circumstances, we have ordered the home incarceration of the defendants pending sentence, with electronic

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monitoring. The government and defense counsel are granted until Wednesday, November 8, 2006, to announce any bail stipulation reached. In the absence of a stipulation or if the stipulation does not merit court approval, then we will state the amount of bail pending sentence. The Probation/Pretrial Department will implement the terms of this Order forthwith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 3rd day of November, 2006.

9 S/José Antonio Fusté 10 JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE 11 Chief U. S. District Judge